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Ending the Sri Lankan Civil War
Sumit Ganguly
Abstract: The Sri Lankan Civil War erupted in 1983 and dragged on until 2009. The origins of the con-
flict can be traced to Sri Lanka’s colonial era and subsequent postcolonial policies that had significantly 
constrained the social and economic rights of the minority Tamil population. Convinced that political av-
enues for redressing extant grievances were unlikely to yield any meaningful results, a segment of the Tamil 
community turned to violence precipitating the civil war. A number of domestic, regional, and interna-
tional efforts to bring about a peaceful solution to the conflict all proved to be futile. A military strategy, 
which involved extraordinary brutality on the part of the Sri Lankan armed forces, brought it to a close. 
However, few policy initiatives have been undertaken in its wake to address the underlying grievances of 
the Tamil citizenry that had contributed to the outbreak of the civil war in the first place. 
The Sri Lankan Civil War vividly demonstrates the 
potential brutality and tenuousness of efforts to end 
civil wars.1 In this case, war termination was the result 
of an outright military victory. But the conditions that 
made it possible to end the Sri Lankan Civil War may 
have been unique: a particular constellation of factors, 
at systemic, regional, and national levels, proved con-
ducive for the pursuit of an unbridled military cam-
paign that ended the war. At a systemic level, the ma-
jor powers, including the United States and key Euro-
pean nations, had tired of the conflict. The two major 
regional powers, the People’s Republic of China (prc) 
and India, for differing reasons, chose to either sup-
port the Sri Lankan regime as it embarked on a mas-
sive military onslaught against the rebels or to remain 
aloof from the conflict. Domestically, the regime that 
had recently assumed power concluded that it had 
found an opportune moment to unleash the full might 
of its military against the insurgents. Consequently, 
it is unlikely that similar conditions will be present 
in other contexts.
In May 2009, after two and a half decades of spo-
radic violent conflict, the Sri Lankan Civil War, which 
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arose from the animosity between the ma-
jority Sinhalese and the minority Tam-
il populations, finally drew to a close. The 
end of this war was especially bloody, with 
charges of rampant human rights violations 
on the part of the two principal parties, the 
Sri Lankan armed forces and the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (ltte). In the final 
military assault that lasted from January to 
early May 2009, some seven thousand eth-
nic Tamils were killed.2 But the total num-
ber killed in the civil war is a vigorously con-
tested subject. The United Nations puts the 
death toll between eighty thousand and one 
hundred thousand. The Sri Lankan govern-
ment, however, challenges those figures.3 
Apart from the death toll, following the ter-
mination of hostilities, as many as three 
hundred thousand Tamils who had fled 
the war zone were interned in overcrowded 
camps.4
This essay will discuss the origins of the 
Sri Lankan Civil War, briefly examine its 
international dimensions (including an 
abortive Indian effort to terminate the 
war between 1987 and 1989), discuss the 
third-party negotiations to conclude the 
conflict, and focus on the politico-military 
strategy that led to its end. Finally, it will 
argue that the mode in which the war end-
ed may have damaged the prospects of a 
lasting peace. 
The origins of the Tamil-Sinhala conflict 
can be traced back to Sri Lanka’s colonial 
history. During the period of British colo-
nial rule, which extended from 1815 to 1948, 
the minority Tamil community seized var-
ious opportunities for economic advance-
ment. To that end, significant numbers of 
the community had availed themselves of a 
colonial education, primarily because they 
had limited economic opportunities in the 
regions in which they were located. The 
dominant Sinhala community, with marked 
exceptions, however, had distanced them-
selves from the British. Not surprisingly, 
when independence came to Sri Lanka in 
1948 (largely as a consequence of British co-
lonial withdrawal from India in 1947), Tam-
ils were disproportionately represented in 
public services, higher education, journal-
ism, and the legal profession.5 
The Sinhala elite, who had worked with 
the British from the early 1930s to bring 
about an eventual transfer of power, had 
paid little heed to the inherently ethnical-
ly plural features of the country. When uni-
versal adult franchise was extended to all Sri 
Lankans in 1931 under the Donoughmore 
Constitution, no provisions were includ-
ed to guarantee minority rights. Not sur-
prisingly, key members of both the Tam-
il and Muslim communities had protest-
ed the absence of clear-cut provisions for 
the protection of minority rights. Tamils, 
unhappy with the constitutional dispen-
sation, boycotted the elections held un-
der the aegis of this constitution. Even the 
subsequent Soulbury Constitution of 1947, 
which paved the way to independence, did 
not include a bill of rights. It did, however, 
include a clause that prohibited discrimi-
nation against any citizen on the basis of 
ethnicity or religion, but this constitution-
al provision proved to be rather tenuous. 
In fact, it laid the foundation for what was 
soon to emerge as a unitary and majoritar-
ian state.6 
Worse still, in the aftermath of inde-
pendence, Sri Lanka’s first prime minis-
ter, Don Stephen Senanayake, passed leg-
islation that effectively disenfranchised a 
significant segment of the Tamil commu-
nity, including the descendants of Tamils 
who had been brought to Sri Lanka in the 
nineteenth century as tea and coffee plan-
tation laborers. The passage of this legis-
lation gave the Sinhalese an effective two-
thirds majority in Parliament, thereby en-
suring their dominance.7
Senanayake’s successor, Solomon West 
Ridgeway Bandaranaike, also exploited, un-
til his death in 1952, the overrepresentation 




of Tamils in both the governmental bureau-
cracies and the private sector to stoke re-
sentment among the majority communi-
ty. Among other matters, they argued that 
since Tamils were disproportionately rep-
resented in the field of higher education, 
they were prone to favor fellow Tamils. Ul-
timately, they passed the Sinhala Only Act 
of 1956, which effectively marginalized the 
Tamil community in every possible sphere, 
from employment to higher education. 
Matters worsened over the next two de-
cades for the Tamil population of the coun-
try. One important turning point came in 
1971 when the regime of Prime Minister 
Sirimavo Bandaranaike introduced a sys-
tem of standardization in university ad-
missions. This procedure stipulated that 
Sinhala students with lower scores could 
be granted university admissions.8 Not 
surprisingly, this policy further alienated 
Tamil youth and contributed to their radi-
calization. Subsequently, in 1972, the coun-
try adopted a new constitution. Under 
the terms of this constitution, Buddhism 
was given the foremost status, denigrat-
ing other faiths. This decision contribut-
ed to a milieu of growing majoritarian sen-
timent and created permissive conditions 
for the growth of anti-Tamil commentary 
in public discourse.9 
It was against this political backdrop 
that, in 1976, a young Tamil, Velupillai 
Prabhakaran, who had witnessed the anti- 
Tamil riots of 1958, created the Libera-
tion Tigers of Tamil Eelam as an alterna-
tive to the moderate and agitational poli-
tics of the Tamil United Liberation Front 
(tulf).10 The ltte’s political goals were 
ostensibly similar to those of the tulf: 
like the tulf, it had sought a separate 
Tamil state. However, unlike the tulf, 
it was prepared to wage an armed strug-
gle to achieve that goal. In any case, after 
1983, following the passage of a law that re-
quired legislators to uphold the territori-
al integrity of Sri Lanka, the tulf’s stated 
goal became moot. The ltte, however, re-
mained unalterably committed to the cre-
ation of a separate Tamil state.11
Prabhakaran had apparently conclud-
ed that, after the “standardization” legis-
lation of 1971 and the republican constitu-
tion of 1972, the rights of Tamils in the coun-
try were now under serious assault. He was 
hardly alone in embracing this view of mi-
nority rights. These sentiments were wide-
ly shared among Tamil youth, who Prabha-
karan steadily recruited to the cause of a vi-
olent revolt against the country’s political 
order.12
The Civil War is frequently divided into 
four distinct phases, starting in 1983 with 
the anti-Tamil pogrom in the capital city 
of Colombo. This first phase culminated 
with the Indian intervention in the con-
flict in 1987. The second phase started in 
1990 and ended in 1995 with the collapse of 
the direct talks between the ltte and the 
government of President Chandrika Ku-
maratunga. The third phase, in turn, be-
gan in 1995 and ended with the final col-
lapse of the cease-fire agreement in 2006. 
The fourth and final phase began shortly 
thereafter and lasted until 2009, when the 
ltte was finally defeated. 
Even though the origins of the Civil War 
are widely attributed to the anti-Tamil po-
grom that had swept through the capi-
tal city of Colombo in July 1983, the cat-
alyst for the conflict had been set in mo-
tion somewhat earlier by the killing of four 
policemen, in 1979, allegedly by the ltte. 
Immediately thereafter, the government 
declared a state of emergency in the prov-
ince of Jaffna and in two airports near Co-
lombo and, a week later, Parliament passed 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which, 
though modeled on British legislation, in-
cluded a number of highly controversial 
provisions. Among them were the author-
ity to imprison individuals accused of in-
volvement with terror for up to eighteen 
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months without a trial and virtual immu-
nity for security forces from prosecution. 
But despite the passage of this draconi-
an legislation, matters continued to deteri-
orate. In mid-July 1983, Sri Lankan security 
forces killed Charles Anton, the head of the 
military wing of the ltte.13 Shortly there-
after, in retaliation for his killing, the ltte 
ambushed a Sri Lankan military patrol in 
the northern Sri Lankan province of Jaff-
na and killed thirteen soldiers. The regime 
of President Junius Jayewardene chose to 
bring the bodies of the slain soldiers to Co-
lombo for a mass funeral. This act no doubt 
inflamed Sinhala sentiments and likely cre-
ated conducive conditions for a violent re-
prisal against the Tamil community. How-
ever, there is evidence that elements of the 
regime quickly became complicit in an or-
chestrated attack on Tamils over the course 
of the next few days. Reliable reports sug-
gest that as many as two thousand Tamils 
were killed in the course of a week in Co-
lombo and elsewhere. The police proved to 
be passive spectators, and there is some ev-
idence that members of the armed forces 
even participated in the violence.14 
In the initial days after the pogrom, in-
stead of offering some solace to the ag-
grieved Tamil community, the regime of 
President Jayewardene focused on the re-
sentments of the Sinhala community. To 
no particular surprise, in the wake of the 
pogrom and the governmental response, 
more than one hundred thousand Tamils 
were rendered homeless, and several hun-
dred thousand fled the country to India over 
the next several years. More to the point, 
the incidents served as the basis of a sub-
stantial recruitment tool for the ltte. In ef-
fect, the origins of the full-blown civil war 
that came to engulf the country for the next 
thirty odd years can be traced to the tragic 
events of July 1983. 
The pogrom in Colombo inflamed public 
sentiments in India, especially among fel-
low Tamils in the southern state of Tamil 
Nadu. Beyond this domestic issue, which 
no government in New Delhi could afford 
to ignore, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
was also concerned about growing Amer-
ican influence within Sri Lanka. India was, 
for the most part, then at odds with the 
United States. It had, for reasons of both 
regional politics as well as its strategic de-
pendence on the Soviet Union, refused to 
condemn the Soviet invasion and occupa-
tion of Afghanistan.15
When Indian intelligence agencies re-
ported that the United States could be seek-
ing naval facilities in the eastern port of 
Trincomalee, New Delhi’s anxieties wors-
ened. Keen on asserting India’s influence 
in the domestic politics of Sri Lanka while 
simultaneously addressing the concerns 
of Indian Tamils, Prime Minister Gandhi 
sent a diplomatic mission to Sri Lanka in 
November 1983. The individual chosen for 
this task, G. Parthasarathy, was a veteran 
Indian diplomat and the prime minister’s 
confidante. Parthasarathy was tasked with 
offering a plan for the devolution of power 
to elected regional councils in the Northern 
and Eastern Provinces, where Tamils made 
up the majority. Various forms of opposi-
tion from across the political spectrum, but 
primarily from the Sinhala parties, and the 
lack of support from Sri Lankan President 
Junius Jayewardene, effectively torpedoed 
this Indian initiative.16
In 1983, President Jayewardene gave free 
rein to the country’s armed forces to sup-
press Tamil militancy. The military crack-
down led to significant casualties, includ-
ing among the civilian population. Con-
cerned about the possible repercussions of 
this military operation on the electoral poli-
tics in Tamil Nadu, Indira Gandhi conveyed 
her concerns about Tamil civilian casual-
ties. Jayewardene, however, rebuffed her 
apprehensions. Not one to take kindly to 
such a response, she granted formal autho-
rization to India’s principal counterintelli-




gence and counterespionage organization, 
the Research and Analysis Wing, to provide 
training and assistance to the various Tamil 
militant groups.17 
Over the next several years, the conflict 
expanded and, in May 1987, the Sri Lan- 
kan government launched “Operation Lib-
eration” with the goal of evicting the ltte 
from the jungles of northern Sri Lanka. 
The military onslaught, which was bru-
tal and included the use of barrel bombs 
by the Sri Lankan air force, contributed to 
a large-scale flight of Tamil civilians seek-
ing sanctuary in Tamil Nadu.18 Faced with 
this exodus, the government in New Delhi 
embarked on a humanitarian mission and 
sent in a flotilla of ships with relief supplies. 
The Sri Lankan navy, however, intercepted 
these vessels before they entered Sri Lank-
an waters. Faced with this rebuff, India’s 
policy-makers resorted to an airdrop of re-
lief supplies. The very next day, after giving 
the government in Colombo a mere thirty- 
five-minute notice, five Indian Antonov 
An-32 aircraft accompanied by four Mirage 
fighters airdropped twenty-five tons of re-
lief supplies over Jaffna.19
In an attempt to end the Sri Lankan Civil 
War, while simultaneously appeasing a sig-
nificant domestic constituency in Tamil 
Nadu, the home of over sixty million Indi-
an Tamils, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi–
having assumed the office after the assas-
sination of his mother–sought to broker 
a peace deal between the ltte, five other 
smaller Tamil insurgent groups, and the 
regime of President Jayewardene. 
Under the terms of the accord, the Sri Lan- 
kan government would, following a refer-
endum, devolve power to the Northern and 
Eastern Provinces; Tamil would be accord-
ed the status of an official language; the Sri 
Lankan armed forces would return to the bar-
racks; and the Indian Peace Keeping Force 
(ipkf) would disarm the rebel groups.20
To implement the accord, India sent in a 
contingent of troops in 1987. The vast major-
ity of the various Tamil militant groups ac-
ceded to the disarmament requirements and 
turned in their weaponry within the spec-
ified seventy-two hours. What India’s po-
litical leadership, not to mention its intelli-
gence services, had failed to recognize was 
that the ltte was quite unreconciled to the 
terms of the agreement; its members refused 
to disarm and quickly turned against the 
ipkf. As a consequence, the ipkf’s mission 
metamorphosed from a peacekeeping to a 
peace-enforcement role. Initially, the force 
scored some notable successes against the 
ltte. For example, in November 1987, after 
the relentless offensive “Operation Pawan,” 
it managed to mostly crush the ltte in the 
Jaffna Peninsula.21 This, however, did not 
prove to be a decisive victory. The ltte suc-
cessfully regrouped and the ipkf became 
embroiled in the Sri Lankan Civil War as 
it sought to defeat the ltte. After a loss of 
1,200 personnel and unable to make much 
military headway against the ltte, India 
withdrew its forces in 1990 at the insistence 
of the newly elected government of Presi-
dent Ranasinghe Premadasa.22 In the waning 
days of the ipkf’s presence in Sri Lanka, the 
regime started talks with the ltte. These, 
however, did not amount to much and ulti-
mately collapsed in June 1990.23
In the aftermath of the withdrawal of 
the ipkf from Sri Lanka, the war wors-
ened considerably as neither the Tamil 
militants nor the Sri Lankan regime ap-
peared interested in a political solution to 
the conflict. After its military imbroglio, 
Indian policy-makers also lost interest in 
seeking a resolution to the conflict and In-
dian willingness to provide either moral 
support or material assistance to the Tam-
ils effectively dried up. To curb any efforts 
on the part of the Tamil Nadu government 
to renew ties with the ltte, the Indian na-
tional government dismissed the state gov-
ernment and chose to rule the state directly 
from New Delhi. The ltte’s involvement 
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in the assassination of Prime Minister Ra-
jiv Gandhi during the 1991 election cam-
paign further alienated the government in 
New Delhi from the Tamil cause. 
Meanwhile, in Sri Lanka, the ltte re-
grouped once again and ratcheted up its 
military campaign. In 1993, it killed Presi-
dent Ranasinghe Premadasa in a bomb at-
tack. Indeed, it was not until the election of 
President Chandrika Kumaratunga in Au-
gust 1994 that some hopes of a negotiat-
ed solution to the conflict were rekindled. 
In January 1995, the Kumaratunga govern-
ment reached a cease-fire agreement with 
the ltte. It also promised that a new set 
of proposals for the devolution of power 
would soon be offered. This effort, however, 
proved to be futile when, in that same year, 
the ltte sank a Sri Lankan naval craft.24
In response, the Kumaratunga regime 
launched a military operation against the 
ltte bastions in Jaffna in October 1995. 
This military action, known as “Operation 
Riviresa” (“rays of sunlight”), was large-
ly a tactical success. However, it left mul-
tiple army brigades stranded on the pen-
insula where they could only be supplied 
through the sea or air. The ltte was thus 
able to quickly isolate the Sri Lankan secu-
rity forces and overrun them.25 
For the next several years, war raged in 
the north and the east of the country. In 
January 1998, three ltte suicide bombers 
attacked the most venerable Buddhist site, 
the Temple of the Tooth, which, accord-
ing to devout Buddhists, is the repository 
of a tooth of the Lord Buddha. Retaliato-
ry raids on Tamil temples and homes fol-
lowed.26 Over the course of the next three 
years, the ltte’s actions became even 
more brazen. Two incidents in particular 
are worth noting. The first was a mostly 
abortive suicide attack on President Chan-
drika Kumaratunga in December 1999, 
though it left her wounded and eventual-
ly led to the loss of sight in one eye.27 The 
second episode proved to be costly both in 
terms of human life and property: an at-
tack on the principal airport in Colombo 
that led to the destruction of nearly half of 
the fleet of the government-run Sri Lan- 
kan Airlines.28 In the wake of these vicious 
attacks, the government of President Ku-
maratunga reached out to Norway to me-
diate a peace process. The Norwegians be-
came involved in 2000 and started discus-
sions both with her regime and the ltte.29
In February 2002, for reasons that are not 
entirely clear, the ltte held out the pros-
pect of a cease-fire, which Norwegian medi-
ators managed to broker between the ltte 
and the government of Sri Lanka. Under the 
aegis of this agreement, the road linking 
Jaffna to the rest of Sri Lanka was opened 
for the first time in twelve years, passen-
ger flights to Jaffna were resumed, and the 
government lifted its ban on the ltte. Fur-
thermore, at least in principle, the ltte ap-
peared to have dropped its demand for the 
creation of a separate state.30 
Altogether, Norway hosted six rounds of 
talks, but the process collapsed in March 
2003.31 The talks unraveled largely because 
the United States had proscribed the ltte 
as a terrorist organization. Accordingly, it 
was not permitted to participate in a pre-
paratory donors’ conference in Washing-
ton, D.C. Denied this opportunity and con-
cerned about its loss of legitimacy as an in-
ternational actor, the ltte announced 
their unilateral withdrawal from the nego-
tiations in April 2003.32 Furthermore, hav-
ing previously agreed with Colombo to “ex-
plore a solution founded on the principle 
of internal self-determination in areas of 
historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking 
peoples, based on a federal structure within 
a united Sri Lanka,” the ltte now made the 
resumption of talks conditional on propos-
als for an interim, independent governance 
arrangement in the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces of Sri Lanka.33 Subsequent to the 
termination of these talks, some mediated 
efforts took place in 2006. However, none 




of these proved to be especially fruitful. One 
of them, held in Geneva in February, saw 
more mutual recriminations rather than 
meaningful dialogue. Another, scheduled 
in Oslo in November 2006, saw the ltte 
withdraw as it deemed the Sri Lankan ne-
gotiating team to be too low-ranking.34 The 
fundamental problem with these negotia-
tions was that the two sides faced an un-
bridgeable chasm: they had radically dif-
ferent goals. The Sri Lankan government, 
regardless of regime, wanted to preserve a 
unitary state, and the ltte remained com-
mitted to the creation of a separate Tamil 
state. It is worth noting here that, despite 
the concerted Norwegian efforts to play 
the role of an honest broker, they ultimate-
ly failed. The “treatment regime” for civil 
wars clearly did not prove up to the task in 
the Sri Lankan context.35 
Following the collapse of negotiations, 
the ltte periodically stepped up its at-
tacks, engaged in a series of successful and 
unsuccessful political assassinations (in-
cluding the killing of Tamil foreign min-
ister Lakshman Kadirgamar at his home 
in Colombo in 2005), and fought off a va-
riety of military operations launched by 
the Sri Lankan regime. 
But then the Sri Lankan Supreme Court 
ruled that President Kumaratunga’s term 
had ended and in the new presidential elec-
tion, a hard-line presidential candidate, 
Mahinda Rajapaksa, was elected to office. 
Over the course of the next few years, Ra-
japaksa, in conjunction with his brother, 
Gotabhaya, who was made the minister of 
defense, brought about significant changes 
in military organization and strategy that 
would ring the eventual death-knell of the 
ltte. The government, upon assuming of-
fice, had spelled out a two-track “peace 
process” strategy. At one level, it pursued 
an aggressive military strategy and, at an-
other, it offered a narrow negotiating agen-
da on how to best implement an effective 
cease-fire agreement.36 
The fundamental difference between 
the Rajapaksa regime and its predecessors, 
however, lay in its willingness to grant carte 
blanche to the military to fight the ltte to 
the end, regardless of the economic, hu-
man, and diplomatic costs. More specifi-
cally, it allowed the Sri Lankan military not 
to differentiate between the Tamil popu-
lation and ltte operatives in rebel-con-
trolled areas. It also permitted anti-ltte 
Tamil militants to carry out punitive op-
erations at will. Furthermore, it relied on 
the state-controlled media to carry out a 
deft propaganda campaign that grossly ex-
aggerated ltte casualties in an attempt 
to bolster both public support for mili-
tary operations and to boost the morale 
of its soldiers. Finally, the armed forces, 
for the first time, carried out a mixed-mil-
itary strategy combining guerrilla warfare 
with large-scale artillery assaults support-
ed by air raids. All of these factors created 
conducive conditions for the termination 
of the long, drawn-out civil war.37
How did this brutal civil war finally come 
to a close? In considerable part, it stemmed 
from three sources. At an international level, 
sympathy for the ltte had receded in the 
wake of the September 11 attacks on the 
United States and global sentiment against 
the use of terror had welled up. Earlier, in 
1996, the U.S. Department of State had 
designated the ltte as a “foreign terror-
ist organization,” and, in 2000, the Unit-
ed Kingdom followed suit. These decisions 
hindered the fund-raising efforts of the or-
ganization and hobbled transnational fi-
nancial transfers. 
At a regional level, despite the presence 
of a substantial Tamil community in In-
dia, overt support for the ltte within the 
community had waned since the ltte’s in-
volvement in the assassination of Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi. No national gov-
ernment in New Delhi had any residual 
sympathy for the organization. 
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Finally, when the regime of President Ma-
hinda Rajapaksa chose to start the final mil-
itary onslaught against the ltte, it found 
significant support, especially in the form 
of substantial amounts of military equip-
ment, including six f7 fighter jets, from the 
People’s Republic of China. The prc also 
provided millions of dollars’ worth of oth-
er military equipment and about $1 billion 
in overall assistance.38All three factors, to 
varying degrees, played critical roles in en-
suring the success of the military campaign 
against the ltte. 
The critical turning point in ending the 
civil war came in 2006 when the ltte, be-
lieving that military victory was actual-
ly within its grasp, broke off the Norwe-
gian-brokered cease-fire agreement and 
started what is popularly referred to as 
the Fourth Eelam War. It was at this point 
that the Sri Lankan regime made a calcu-
lated decision to annihilate the ltte. To 
that end, the regime also decided to allo-
cate as much as 3.3 percent of its gdp in 
2007 to military spending (up from 2.8 per-
cent in 2006).39 This increase in the mili-
tary budget also enabled an expansion of 
the armed forces from 120,000 personnel 
in 2005 to 300,000 in 2009. 
Of course, the ltte, despite its decision 
to resume fighting, had been weakened as 
early as 2004 with the defection of an im-
portant leader, Vinayagamoorthy Mura-
litharan, popularly known as “Colonel 
Karuna,” along with some six thousand 
ltte cadres. Because he provided signif-
icant tactical intelligence to the Sri Lan- 
kan armed forces, his defection was signif-
icant militarily. The scale of the defection 
also suggested to the Sri Lankan govern-
ment that the popular legitimacy that the 
ltte had once enjoyed was now waning. 
Battlefield innovation also aided the 
Sri Lankan armed forces in its mission to 
crush the ltte. The army used small, high-
ly trained, mobile groups to infiltrate the 
ltte’s front lines. These groups attacked 
high-value targets, provided real-time in-
telligence, and disrupted the ltte’s lines 
of resupply and communications. They 
were also trained and authorized to call 
in precision air, artillery, and mortar at-
tacks on ltte units.40 Additionally, the 
Sri Lankan armed forces launched opera-
tions that effectively hunted down and de-
stroyed the ltte’s merchant navy. The de-
ployment of high-speed coastal craft and 
accompanying tactics also led to the de-
struction of the ltte’s substantial fleet of 
maritime suicide vessels.41
Military innovation alone, however, can-
not explain the battlefield success of the Sri 
Lankan armed forces. As a number of repu-
table human rights organizations and news 
outlets have shown, the military success 
must also be attributed to the sheer ruth-
lessness of the tactics that were employed. 
These tactics demonstrated a flagrant disre-
gard for established norms and conventions 
governing the use of force. It involved the 
targeting of civilian areas where ltte cad-
res may have taken refuge, the shelling of 
hospitals where wounded ltte forces were 
being treated, and the summary executions 
of any number of individuals suspected of 
being ltte sympathizers.42
The ltte also resorted to brutal military 
tactics as the war drew to a close. Its lead-
ers deliberately placed civilians in the line of 
fire, fully expecting the enemy to fire upon 
them, causing substantial casualties.43 They 
hoped these civilian losses would generate 
international opprobrium against the gov-
ernment and its security forces.44 
Though the war resulted in the eviscera-
tion of the ltte, the underlying grievanc-
es that had precipitated the civil war large-
ly remained unaddressed. Significantly, in 
the wake of the military victory there was 
an unbridled sense of majoritarian ethnic 
triumphalism. Only under significant inter-
national pressure did President Rajapaksa 
appoint a Lessons Learned and Reconcili-
ation Commission in May 2010. The Com-




mission released an interim report in Sep-
tember 2011 and then a final report in No-
vember of the same year, both of which 
came under considerable criticism from 
global human rights organizations for fail-
ing to dispassionately examine allegations 
of rampant human rights violations during 
the final phases of the conflict. More to the 
point, critics underscored a distinct progov-
ernment bias in the final report.45 Its short-
comings aside, the report did have a range 
of practical suggestions for promoting rec-
onciliation. Among these were the need to 
bring about a reconciliation with the Tam-
il politicians of the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces, the election of provincial gov-
ernments, the resettling of the internal-
ly displaced, and suitable Tamil represen-
tation in the armed forces and the govern-
ment.46 These recommendations, for the 
most part, have yet to be implemented. 
An extremely determined and single- 
minded military effort, facilitated by region-
al and international conditions, brought an 
end to the civil war. The military offensive 
of the Sri Lankan armed forces against the 
ltte took place against a particular political 
backdrop and at a specific historical junc-
ture; it was a moment when global toler-
ance for any political movement embracing 
terror was at its lowest ebb in years. 
Globally, the United States and the Eu-
ropean Union did little to rein in the Sri 
Lankan government as it embarked on the 
final stages of its military offensive. Region-
al states, such as the prc and Pakistan, ac-
tively supported the government.47 India, 
which could have exerted some restraint 
on the regime, chose not to do so. The mil-
itary victory of the Sri Lankan armed forces 
over the ltte was complete and unequivo-
cal. Obviously, seeking the total destruction 
of an adversary is one possible strategy for 
successful civil war termination.
There is little or no question that the ltte 
as a viable military force has been effective-
ly destroyed. As argued earlier, a combina-
tion of international, regional, and domes-
tic forces all converged and facilitated the 
military defeat of the ltte. The most sig-
nificant of these factors, however, was the 
emergence of a regime in Sri Lanka pre-
pared to brook no opposition in its goal to 
terminate the protracted conflict. The suc-
cessful defeat of the ltte and the concom-
itant end to the civil war initially generat-
ed widespread support and popular enthu-
siasm for the regime, especially among the 
Sinhala population of the country.
Despite its popularity in the aftermath of 
the civil war, the Rajapaksa regime suffered 
an unexpected defeat in 2015. The common 
opposition candidate, Maithripala Sirise-
na, received 51.3 percent of the popular vote. 
Rajapaksa’s ethnic triumphalism had alien-
ated both the Tamil and Muslim minorities 
and his grasp on the Sinhalese majority had 
slipped due to charges of widespread cor-
ruption and nepotism.48
Despite the evisceration of the ltte and 
the emergence of a new regime, the per-
ceived injustices of the Tamil community 
that had set in motion the social and po-
litical forces precipitating the civil war, for 
the most part, remain unaddressed. The 
new regime, to its credit, established a new 
Office of National Unity and Reconcili-
ation, which primarily deals with the re-
lease of detainees and the return of civilian 
land that the military had occupied. The 
office has only been partially successful 
in addressing these matters. Yet the Pre-
vention of Terrorism Act, which granted 
the government sweeping powers of arrest 
and detention, still remains in force, and 
many who had been incarcerated under its 
auspices have yet to be released.49
Much disaffection with the present Sri 
Lankan regime of Maithripala Sirisena 
still pervades the Tamil diaspora commu-
nities.50 His stated willingness to address 
the concerns of the diaspora notwithstand-
ing, it is far from certain that he will be able 
147 (1)  Winter 2018 87
Sumit 
Ganguly
to win the necessary domestic political sup-
port to effectively pursue such a strategy. 
Significant social forces and institution-
al barriers that remain could hobble any 
steps toward reconciliation. One of these, 
of course, is the Buddhist clergy, who re-
main a significant political entity in the 
country and have little sympathy for their 
Tamil compatriots.51
Another institutional barrier in the path-
way toward reconciliation is the uniformed 
military. Over the course of this protract-
ed civil war and especially during the re-
gime of President Rajapaksa, the military 
became a vital political actor. The leeway 
it was granted contributed dramatically to 
the militarization of the country. Shrinking 
the role and the scope of the armed forces 
will prove to be no easy task.52 Under cur-
rent conditions, it is hard to envisage how 
a renewed violent Tamil opposition could 
again emerge. In the absence of concert-
ed efforts to address the human and mate-
rial costs of the civil war and its anteced-
ents, Sri Lanka is likely to remain a deeply 
fractured nation riven with profound eth-
nic cleavages. The shared sense of nation-
al identity that Francis Fukuyama deems so 
necessary to underpin a state’s legitimacy 
does not exist in Sri Lanka.53 Instead, sig-
nificant segments of the Tamil community 
remain disaffected from the Sinhala-domi-
nated Sri Lankan state.
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